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 Trish Roberts-Miller
 Discursive Conflict in Communities and Classrooms
 Communitarianism and compositionists' use of the concept of "communities of dis-
 course," while intended to promote inclusive discourse, can easily fall prey to the myth
 of progressivism, ignoring the relative costs of discursive conflict or the pressures of
 consensus and conformity.
 In a 1989 CCCs Staffroom Interchange piece, Delores Schriner and William
 Rice describe a situation in which a foreign student writes an extremely ho-
 mophobic message to a class mailing list-advocating the death penalty for
 homosexuals, something which is "a practice common in his homeland" (477).
 They say that the instructor recommended on the list that "students who were
 offended by the discussion should feel free to ignore it and go on to other
 'items"'-advice that was itself ignored by some students, so that the argu-
 ment did continue. Schriner and Rice conclude:
 In the end, however, the students clearly had learned how to negotiate among
 starkly different sets of values in their community, and during class meetings no
 hostile words or glances were directed to the dissenting student, who remained
 very much a part of the common enterprise. (477)
 This narrative is typical in many ways. Anyone who has taught a discus-
 sion-based class has had something similar happen, and most of us have prob-
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 ably had a reaction similar to the teacher's. We want, somehow, not to censor a
 student yet neither to have the class dissolve in rancor. While the teaching of
 writing, especially argumentative writing, requires disagreement, the general
 perception is that too much conflict can threaten the "community of discourse"
 in the classroom by leading to a breakdown in civility. An unremarkable as-
 sumption in the passage quoted above is that the common enterprise would
 have collapsed had students been more personally hostile to the homophobic
 student. Schriner and Rice focus on the potential for that student to be alien-
 ated from the community; the story is a success because he was not.
 At the center of the story is the issue of inclusion and difference. To some
 extent, it was hoped that the notion of communities of discourse in rhetoric
 and composition would help with that is-
 sue (albeit, generally in terms of students' Neither the concept of communities of
 inclusion into academic discourse com- discourse nor communitarian political theory
 munities); more recently, communitarian has helped or will help composition instructors
 political theory has been proposed for that work through issues of inclusion and difference
 purpose (Killingsworth; Clark). My argu- because these concepts are similarly troubled
 ment is that neither the concept of com- by confusion about the place of discursive
 munities of discourse nor communitarian conflict in communities.
 political theory has helped or will help
 composition instructors work through issues of inclusion and difference be-
 cause these concepts are similarly troubled by confusion about the place of
 discursive conflict in communities. I will make this argument in three ways: by
 engaging in a less triumphal reading of the episode with the homophobic stu-
 dent, then explicating the controversies over communitarian political theory,
 and finally ending with a fairly brief discussion of the notion of communities
 of discourse.
 I. Community
 I find the story of the homophobic student much more disturbing than Schriner
 and Rice seem to for two main reasons. First, I fail to see the maintenance of
 civility as such a triumph; second, I think that they were paying attention to
 the wrong difference. In regard to the first point, there is no indication that the
 students' sets of values were significantly changed by the e-mail exchange, nor
 even that they learned how to argue in substantially different ways. Thus, when
 Schriner and Rice say, "the students clearly had learned how to negotiate among
 starkly different sets of values in their community," they seem to mean simply
 that the students maintained American standards of civility in the classroom.
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 I will suggest that is one problem with the concept of communities of discourse
 as well as with communitarian political theory-that it is not at all clear what
 constitutes successful discourse, other than some vague sense of people re-
 maining cordial.
 This incident is presented as a narrative of successful negotiation of dif-
 ference: but which difference? The foreign student on the mailing list was tak-
 ing a different stance but one that is far
 Suggest that is one problem with the concept from uncommon i American culture and
 of communities of discourse, as well as with that is dominant in his own. So, that
 communitarian political theory-that it is not student's position is only momentarily in
 at all clear what constitutes successful the position of Other, and this is just one
 discourse, other than some vague sense of community in which it is an unpopular
 people remaining cordial. stance. For that student, being different in
 this regard is the anomalous situation. But,
 what about a gay student? Chances are good that at least one student in the
 class was homosexual. For that student or students, the "intense and lengthy
 exchanges on homosexuality" (Schriner and Rice 477) were likely simply one
 more instance of hearing themselves demonized, pathologized, and threatened.
 It may well have been a community that re-inscribed gay students' posi-
 tion as Other and that reinforced their alienation from the community. At the
 same time, the teacher's advice simply to ignore what must be a very frighten-
 ing kind of message for a gay student to receive potentially trivializes the expe-
 rience. That advice fails to distinguish between students who are offended by
 the notion that homosexuality is a crime that should be punished by death
 and those who feel themselves-and, to some degree, are-physically threat-
 ened by such an argument. Schriner and Rice refer to the "community" and
 "common enterprise," but to what extent were gay students ever part of that
 community, and to what extent did they feel a part of the common enterprise?
 I would suggest that one could see a similar confusion in Schriner and
 Rice's comment about "the community's commitment to absolute freedom of
 expression" (477). Even ignoring the issue of whether or not the community
 actually had such a commitment-I assume the institution, if not the instruc-
 tors, would have done something very quickly had someone started posting
 jpegs of child pornography-the fact that the instructors insisted upon the
 students having freedom from a certain censorship does not in any way ensure
 that students felt free to post what they really believed. James Kastely has dis-
 cussed this problem as "the denial of difference in the postulation of the ab-
 stracted self of an idealized equality" (242). What seems to an instructor to be
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 an open and inclusive area for argument may or may not actually be one. No
 community has absolute freedom of expression either in the sense that the
 discourse is equally open to all points of view nor in the sense that the dis-
 course has equal costs for all participants. There are different costs for a stu-
 dent who says, "some of my best friends are gay, and I do not think they should
 be executed," and a student who says, "I am gay, and I don't think I should be
 executed." The first is simply an argument in a class mailing list; the second is
 potentially a life change. Simply be- Because it does not appear that anyone is
 cause the expression is not overtly cen-
 cause the expression is not overtly cen- excluded from the physical community, we fail to
 sored by the instructor, it is not neces-
 sored by the ins , it is nt n - think carefully about other forms of exclusion.
 sarily free. I will suggest that this is a
 political as well as pedagogical problem. Because there is a lot of discourse, we
 do not ask what kind it is. Because it does not appear that anyone is excluded
 from the physical community, we fail to think carefully about other forms of
 exclusion. The discourse of community can obscure the discursive inequali-
 ties that really exist among members of that community.
 II. Communitarianism
 Something that troubles compositionists' discussions of politics and political
 discourse is that there is very little acknowledgment (or possibly even knowl-
 edge) of the variety of models for democratic discourse. A glaring example is
 when compositionists conflate a political agenda (e.g., conservative versus lib-
 eral) with models of democracy (e.g., the liberal versus agonistic public spheres).
 Although the word liberal comes up in both contexts, it does not mean the
 same thing (for an example of that conflation, see Killingsworth). By the term
 "liberal model," political theorists mean something that is only historically re-
 lated to what is popularly called liberal politics or a liberal education. The rela-
 tion between the two, as David Held has said, is historically complicated and
 very nearly random. A product of the Enlightenment (hence to avoid confu-
 sion I refer to it as "the Enlightenment model"), the liberal model theorizes a
 public space in which people rely on rational discourse in order to determine
 what is in the universal best interest. At the same time that they have the abil-
 ity to ignore their own particular situations and needs, interlocutors remain
 fundamentally (even profoundly) individual-able to resist the pressures of
 conformity, to think critically about their own traditions, to stand above and
 away from the crowd.
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 Communitarianism takes issue with this view of public discourse and
 the role of the state on two points: first, whether the moral conditions neces-
 sary for democracy are sociohistorical constructs; second, whether liberal po-
 litical theory's goal of autonomy means that there is too much emphasis on
 individual rights and too little emphasis on the public good.
 Communitarian political theorists claim to be resurrecting the civic-re-
 publican model of someone like Aristotle (see especially Michael Sandel's
 Democracy's Discontent, Ronald Beiner, and Charles Taylor). Aristotle's vision
 of the public realm, they argue, is one that assumes a particular ethos, both of
 the culture at large and of the individuals who participate. By insisting that a
 cultural ethos and a political system are necessarily connected, they reject the
 Enlightenment model of the public sphere's positing democracy as something
 that transcends particular cultural mores (as in, for instance, John Rawls's A
 Theory of ustice or Jurgen Habermas's Structural Transformation of the Public
 Communitarians argue that the very Sphere). Communitarians argue that the very ex-
 existence of democracy depends upon a istence of democracy depends upon a culture
 cultue tt p s pn in that presents participation in civic life as both a culture that presents participation in
 civic life as both a duty and a jy. duty and a joy. In Sandel's terms, the premise is
 ivicfeasbothadtyandajoy. "to be free is to share in governing a political com-
 munity that controls its own fate. Self-government in this sense requires po-
 litical communities that control their destinies, and citizens who identify suf-
 ficiently with those communities to think and act with a view to the common
 good" (Democracys Discontent 274). Thus, they argue, a central aspiration of
 the Enlightenment model of democracy (neutrality in regard to morals) is both
 inaccurate and destructive. It is inaccurate because the liberal model does have
 a moral agenda, privileging autonomy as an inherent good, and damaging be-
 cause it encourages people to think of morality as a private issue, thereby fa-
 cilitating evasion of participation in one's community.
 Beiner, for instance, uses a reductio ad absurdum in order to argue that
 the state cannot remain genuinely neutral to citizens' conceptions of the good
 life because democracy would collapse were enough people to pursue total
 hedonism:
 The liberal state ought to be uncompromisingly neutral... [in weighing] a con-
 ception of the good life geared toward the attainment of chemical euphoria at
 every opportunity [versus] a conception of the good life focused on ideas of social
 responsibility [...] . It should not require a very sophisticated moral reflection to
 see that this provides a recipe not for principled liberal statesmanship but for the
 540
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 moral self-destruction of the liberal state. To the extent that the state comes to
 understand itself in these terms, it brings down upon itself just this kind of self-
 vitiating calamity. (Beiner 67)
 Beiner and others argue that there is an ethos of democracy that the state has
 a valid interest in promoting simply to preserve democracy.
 There is empirical support for that claim. Democracy cannot be preserved
 simply through the presence of a democratic constitution because a demo-
 cratic constitution is of little help if there is a military coup, corrupt judicial
 system, stronger country mining one's harbor and funding terrorists, cultural
 tolerance of corruption, and so on. Robert Dahl and others have articulated
 the conditions historically connected to democratic practice, some of which
 are institutional (such as civilian control of the military, a distinction between
 the military and the police forces, multiple sources of power) but many of which
 are cultural. The ethos must be one that values honesty, promotes concern for
 the public good, recommends tolerance, reveres long-term over short-term
 planning, favors universal education, encourages people to work within politi-
 cal systems to effect political change (Nie et al. 16-24, see also Dahl, Democ-
 racy and Its Critics 244-51, On Democracy 145-59).
 Some communitarians position themselves between people who want the
 government to enforce moral behavior and those who argue that morality is
 always a private issue that is no one else's business. This middle ground has
 more discourse about morality but not (at least in theory) more laws requiring
 moral behavior. The "Responsive Communitarian Platform" says:
 Moral voices achieve their effect mainly through education and persuasion, rather
 than through coercion. Originating in communities, and sometimes embodied
 in law, they exhort, admonish, and appeal to what Lincoln called the better an-
 gels of our nature. (Etzioni et al. xxvi)
 Communitarians argue that legislation always does and always must have
 a moral basis and that a society must be grounded in some kind of moral con-
 sensus. But, "while we search for moral consensus, the ideas underpinning a
 moral consensus are mutual dialogue and persuasion, not imposition" (Etzioni,
 Introduction xix).
 Communitarianism tends to be a very pragmatic discourse, with little in
 the way of theorizing in the way that, for example, Rawls or Habermas ponder
 the ontological assumptions behind their models of discourse. If there is some
 kind of philosophical basis, it tends to be Alasdair MacIntyre's work (especially
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 After Virtue) in which he argues, "the Aristotelian tradition can be restated in
 a way that restores intelligibility and rationality to our moral and social atti-
 tudes and commitments" (259). MacIntyre calls for rejecting the Enlighten-
 ment search for universal bases of moral discourse, suggesting that we should
 instead simply acknowledge and accept that our moral systems are particular.
 By accepting that they are not universal, we can also acknowledge that they
 need preservation and regeneration-that the duty of philosophy is and should
 be to encourage a specific set of ethics.
 Charles Taylor has suggested that the very model of the self upon which
 democracy depends is just such a cultural construct and not a foundational
 (or transcendent) premise:
 The basic error of atomism in all its forms is that it fails to take account of the
 degree to which the free individual with his own goals and aspirations, whose just
 rewards it is trying to protect, is himself only possible within a certain kind of
 civilization; that it took a long development of certain institutions and practices,
 of the rule of law, of rules of equal respect, of habits of common deliberation, of
 common association, of cultural development, and so on, to produce the modern
 individual. (309; see also MacIntyre on the autonomous individual, 34)
 But, without appealing to principles of some sort that undergird or tran-
 scend particular socio-historical preferences, it becomes difficult to defend
 For many critics of communitarianism, the lack some very fragile principles-such as the
 of foundation and apparent deference to notion ofminority rights.Formany crit- ics of communitarianism, the lack of
 community standards means that the tyranny foundation and apparent deference to
 of the majority looms large. community standards means that the
 tyranny of the majority looms large. The Civil Rights movement was a very
 anti-communitarian movement in that it violated numerous preferences of
 segregated communities; the whole argument depended upon rhetors like the
 Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., being able to say that some laws were transi-
 tory and prejudiced (e.g., laws segregating public parks), while other laws were
 grounded in a more permanent foundation (e.g., in the Constitution, in Judeo-
 Christian ethics). The very legitimacy of Reverend King participating in the
 Birmingham protests, for instance, depended upon his rejection of commu-
 nity standards in favor of universals, perhaps most famously stated in his as-
 sertion in "Letter from Birmingham Jail" that "injustice anywhere is a threat to
 justice everywhere."
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 If one abandons the quest for transpolitical foundation, then how does
 one criticize any community? Critics of communitarianism fear that the logi-
 cal consequence is that all preferences have equal weight-a preference for
 Christian prayer, a preference for civil rights, a preference for equal applica-
 tion of laws, a preference for segregation-as long as they are expressed as
 community preferences (for a brief discussion of this argument, see Habermas's
 "Three Normative Models"). In fact, on what grounds can communitarians
 criticize the Enlightenment model of discourse, which they grant to be the
 dominant one, without falling into self-contradiction? In addition, by their very
 arguments, they present some values as more foundational, more transcen-
 dent, than others (as when Sandel assumes that religious obligations are al-
 ways stronger than secular ones), and they criticize what they themselves
 describe as a community practice-liberalism. There is, then, potentially a con-
 tradiction between what and how communitarians argue-to what extent do
 advocates of communitarianism themselves enact the practice they advocate?
 Another question frequently raised is just what is supposed to happen to
 people who dissent from the community's morals. One possible answer, and
 one explicitly given by some communitarians, is that people who are unhappy
 with the ethos dominant in any given community have the ability to form their
 own communities (see especially Sandel's Democracy's Discontent, Etzioni's In-
 troduction). Personally, I find this suggestion unintentionally reminiscent of
 the "America: Love It or Leave It" or "Back to Africa" bumper stickers that were
 popular during the Vietnam War controversy and Civil Rights movement.
 Beiner's criticism is more civil; he describes the logical problems in this solu-
 tion, saying that
 The withdrawal into particularistic communities merely confirms what defines
 the problem in the first place. Here the communitarian is landed in a quandary
 that exactly matches that of the liberal. If what is required is a truly national com-
 munity, the communitarian promise would seem to be a hopeless one, for clearly
 no modern industrial state can sustain this sort of community without stoking
 up the very hazardous fires of nationalism. On the other hand, if what is sought is
 the autonomy of local communities as such, there is no assurance that this will
 not give further momentum to the relativization of tastes and morals that man-
 dated liberal neutralism in the first place. So the appeal to community, far from
 resolving the quandaries of liberalism, merely confirms them in another guise. (31)
 The Enlightenment value of autonomy is criticized (by communitarians, among
 others) as both inaccurate and destructive-inaccurate because people are
 543
This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Mon, 08 Aug 2016 18:33:39 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 CCC 54:4 / JUNE 2003
 The Enlightenment value of autonomy is criticized (by
 communitarians, among others) as both inaccurate and
 destructive-inaccurate because people are not really
 independent of one another (no man is an island, so to
 speak) and damaging because the value encourages us to
 ignore our very real interdependence. But, the very notion
 that someone who dislikes the mores of one community
 could simply join another merely shifts the still problematic
 concept of autonomy from individuals to communities.
 not really independent of one
 an er (no man is an island,
 so to speak) and damaging be-
 cause the value encourages us
 to ignore our very real interde-
 pendence. But, the very notion
 that someone who dislikes
 the mores of one community
 could simply join another
 merely shifts the still problem-
 atic concept of autonomy from
 individuals to communities. There is no reason to think that the inaccuracy
 and damage of autonomy suddenly dissipates by shifting the concept to au-
 tonomous communities rather than to autonomous individuals; no commu-
 nity is an island, and lifeboat ethics is no ethics at all.
 The practical consequence of the ostensible anti-foundationalism of
 communitarianism is that yet something else for which communitarians criti-
 cize Enlightenment theories-a tendency to mistake their own preferences for
 values with a foundational basis-is evident in their own discourse. The "Re-
 sponsive Communitarian Platform," for instance, in its ringing endorsement
 of the two-parent family, equates two-parent families with heterosexual two-
 parent families, an equation that is not justified in the already problematic
 social science research the authors cite as support and which seems little more
 than sheer prejudice on their part. It is striking, after all, that this is the only
 plank based on social science research. The communitarian platform has no
 coherent underlying principle that informs when social science should deter-
 mine public policy and when it should not.
 One can make the same observation about communitarianism in gen-
 eral-while its pragmatic quality is very attractive, especially to rhetoricians,
 it gives the movement a kind of ad hoc quality that makes consistent applica-
 tions of principles unlikely. While the central goal of communitarianism is that
 people should rely on persuasion more than on governmental intervention,
 the various authors in the Essential Communitarian Reader (Etzioni) argue for
 governmental intervention for such diverse purposes as to preserve affirma-
 tive action (Selznick 64), repeal no-fault divorce laws (Etzioni, "A Moral" 45
 and Etzioni et al. "Platform"), actively engage in public health campaigns to
 promote marriage, attain full employment (Selznick 68), ban the sale of to-
 bacco or turn it into a prescription drug (Goodin 121), use "taxation and regu-
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 lation to reduce the incidence of cigarette smoking" (Kleiman 224), make drink-
 ing alcohol a privilege which requires a license (Kleiman 224), engage in re-
 institutionalization of the mentally ill (Siegel 194), institute anti-begging
 ordinances (Siegel 195), ban guns (Etzioni et al.), engage in random drug test-
 ing of people who have been previously convicted of drug possession (Kleiman
 225). I do not list these because I think they are all absurd but because the
 almost random quality of the list suggests that communitarianism can be used
 to attack whatever happens to be the pet irritation of the particular author or
 require obeisance to their bigotry (as in the case of privileging heterosexual
 marriage). If theorists engage in this kind of behavior, it is hard to imagine that
 communities would not do so as well; thus, despite theorists' claims that
 communitarianism would not result in simple imposition of majority religious,
 social, and economic prejudices on minorities, the theorists' own rhetoric sug-
 gest that is exactly what would happen.
 Communitarianism has a kind of pragmatic appeal and a pragmatic way
 to make its arguments. Yet this leaves one with the worry that the central terms,
 such as community and speech, are insufficiently theorized. Communitarian
 theorists are not always clear just when speech is
 action and when it may even inhibit action, so that
 it sometimes seems as though the goal is a vibrant
 and active public sphere of discourse with little
 thought as to the real consequences or costs of that
 speech. For instance, the "Responsive Commun-
 itarian Platform" says that people should be en-
 couraged to voice their disapproval of one another
 and to "express our moral concerns to others when
 it comes to issues we care deeply about" (Etzioni
 et al. xxxi). The platform comments that people
 probably should not chastise one another about not
 keeping lawns green, but that's exactly what would
 happen-community associations are notorious
 Communitarians call for two things at
 the same time: more argument and
 more community. These two goals are
 not necessarily contradictory, but
 they can be, depending upon how
 one defines community and what
 kind f disc urse one considers good
 argument. To t  extent that a theory
 (or pedagogy) assumes that a good
 community has minimal conflict, it is
lmost certain to founder on the
 problems of inclusion and difference.
 for trying to intervene in the deepest corners of personal lives and often on
 very shaky bases.
 Communitarians call for two things at the same time: more argument
 and more community. These two goals are not necessarily contradictory, but
 they can be, depending upon how one defines community and what kind of
 discourse one considers good argument. To the extent that a theory (or peda-
 gogy) assumes that a good community has minimal conflict, it is almost cer-
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 tain to founder on the problems of inclusion and difference. The problem may
 well be in the vagueness of the term community, and both compositionists
 and communitarians have tried to clarify it by distinguishing between physi-
 cal and intellectual communities. A more useful distinction is the one used by
 Beiner, who is himself adopting a distinction made by Robert Paul Wolff, be-
 tween "affective" and "rational" communities. "Affective communities" are ones
 defined by shared values and shared identities, by what Beiner critically refers
 to as "the raptures of Gemeinshaft" (33). "Rational communities" are ones de-
 fined by the need to make decisions together, "a shared world of political con-
 cerns that affect all in common" (33). As long as we are after the raptures of
 gemeinshaft, civility is necessary and significant difference is dangerous. If,
 however, our expectation is not to feel snug but to make decisions along with
 the various people whom the decisions affect, then difference is necessary, and
 homogeneity is dangerous, and we find ourselves in conflictual discourse (which
 may or may not be especially civil). Beiner's distinction is wonderful, but for
 purposes of thinking about pedagogy, it's just slightly inadequate. To put it in
 a somewhat crude fashion, one might imagine a matrix with two axes. On one
 axis is the degree to which one considers ideal speech to be oriented toward
 agreement (irenic) or disagreement (agonistic). On the other axis is the degree
 to which one posits deliberation as the function of the public sphere, whether it is
 a place in which individuals simply express their points of view (expressive) or
 a place in which groups try to establish mutually binding policy (deliberative).
 agonistic and expressive agonistic and deliberative
 irenic and expressive irenic and deliberative
 This is not the conventional way of categorizing speech, as most domi-
 nant theories (e.g., Alexander Bain, James Kinneavy) put expressive speech at
 the other end of a continuum from argument, but those theories ignore that
 there is such a thing as expressive argument (a very real possibility in
 communitarian political theory). In addition, such a taxonomy obscures that
 there is considerable difference of opinion as to just what makes an argument
 good. In an irenic public sphere, one defines a productive argument as one
 that results in the interlocutors reaching agreement on the issue about which
 they originally disagreed (or one in which there was never disagreement in the
 first place). In an agonistic public sphere, one defines an argument as produc-
 tive if it raises interesting questions, brings up injustices, or draws attention to
 points of view that had been obscured (by agonistic, I mean the kind theorized
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 by Hannah Arendt, Kenneth Burke, or John
 Mill). By the criteria of an irenic public sphere,
 the Federalist/Anti-Federalist debate was a
 failure because the Federalists and Anti-Fed-
 eralists never reached agreement; there is not
 even any indication that the major propo-
 nents of either view shifted position. If one
 values agonism, however, the debate was very
 productive, both in the sense that it led to a
 discussion of the constitutional principles
 that remains influential in Supreme Court
 decisions and political theory, and in the very
 pragmatic consequence that the debate led
 to the Bill of Rights.
 The second axis concerns the function
 of discourse, whether the participants are
 trying to settle policy questions. Thus, one
 might have a fundamentally irenic group
 Communitarians argue that there should be
 more argument about morals, that public
 discourse should not avoid such topics in
 the way that we do. But what kind of
 discourse should it be? Is it discourse that
 hopes to reach perfect agreement on issues
 of policy (irenic and deliberative)? Discourse
 in which there will be perfect agreement,
 but no policies will be set (irenic and
 expressive)? Discourse in which policies will
 be established, but agreement is expected
 to be contingent and imperfect (agonistic
 and deliberative)? Discourse in which
 people are trying to air their differences,
 expecting neither to reach agreement nor
 set policies (agonistic and expressive)?
 (such as a support group) that has two different kinds of meetings: ones in
 which people describe their experiences and express their feelings, expecting
 support, and ones in which the group is trying to determine policy, still with a
 strong ethos that people should be supportive of one another. This distinction
 is also obscured in much discourse concerning rhetoric, going as far back as
 Aristotle categorizing speech as deliberative, sometimes depending on its lo-
 cus (as in Rhetoric) and sometimes depending on discursive qualities (as in
 Nicomachean Ethics). Yet, the distinction is important, as a purely expressive
 polis need not have any argumentation (one can express one's point of view
 just as effectively simply through voting or checking boxes in a poll), but delib-
 eration requires that interlocutors pay attention to one another, interweaving
 others' arguments with their own.
 These are axes, not dichotomies. The U.S. Congress is less agonistic than
 the British Parliament, more agonistic than the community association meet-
 ings I've observed. And, of course, any particular group will engage in a range
 of practices, at moments becoming more or less agonistic and deliberative,
 and so on. Thus, my point is not to drop certain practices into certain boxes
 but to point out potentially fatal contradictions.
 Communitarians argue that there should be more argument about mor-
 als, that public discourse should not avoid such topics in the way that we do.
 But what kind of discourse should it be? Is it discourse that hopes to reach
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 perfect agreement on issues of policy (irenic and deliberative)? Discourse in
 which there will be perfect agreement, but no policies will be set (irenic and
 expressive)? Discourse in which policies will be established, but agreement is
 expected to be contingent and imperfect (agonistic and deliberative)? Discourse
 in which people are trying to air their differences, expecting neither to reach
 agreement nor set policies (agonistic and expressive)?
 In an irenic and expressive public sphere, difference is a liability, insofar
 as it threatens to upset agreement. It is not inherently fatal to the discourse,
 though, as people may not even be aware of the degree of disagreement since,
 in an expressivist public sphere, one always has the option of expressing with-
 out listening or, to put it another way, closing one's eyes as one speaks. Thus, if
 communitarians imagine a public sphere that has more expression of argu-
 ments regarding morality, then having more argument and more community
 is not a contradiction (depending, to some degree, on the definition of com-
 munity, discussed below), as long as people behave in a polite fashion to one
 another (as in the Schriner and Rice narrative). If that is their argument, how-
 ever, I fail to see any absence of such argument; it seems to me that we already
 have a public sphere with plenty of sermonizing in which people do not listen
 to one another.
 Difference is fatal, however, if one wants an irenic and deliberative public
 sphere. To deliberate together, people must listen, so they are well aware of the
 disagreement. More important, it seems com-
 Ifthe public sphere is to be measured a mon sense to me to say that the more things
 success only if the interlocutors reach upon which people disagree (especially at the
 agreement (rather than, for instance, level of premises), the harder it will be for them
 learn from the debate), success in the to resolve their initial argument. Thus, if the pub-
 presence of difference is unlikely. lic sphere is to be measured a success only if the
 interlocutors reach agreement (rather than, for
 instance, learn from the debate), success in the presence of difference is un-
 likely. If, as I infer, communitarians imagine an irenic and deliberative public
 sphere, they must necessarily imagine an extremely homogeneous commu-
 nity and/or one in which major disagreements are evaded. That seems to me a
 vision in which calling for more argument and more community is contradic-
 tory, unless one imagines perfect conformity on morals.
 Difference is a virtue in agonistic discourse, so a homogeneous commu-
 nity is a liability for that vision, whether the function of discourse is to express
 views or settle policy issues. It is not clear, however, that agonism and commu-
 nity are compatible, depending upon one's definition of community. Advocates
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 of agonistic rhetoric (e.g., Arendt, Burke) do not particularly revere agreement,
 except as contingent and temporary, nor do they value nonconflictual com-
 munities. Thus, there is not a contradiction in their desire for more discourse
 and more community. I am less convinced of that with communitarians like
 Sandel, Taylor, and Etzioni. I am also concerned with the pragmatic political
 consequences of an expressive public sphere, which assumes value in the mere
 expression of different points of view.
 This last point is best explained through a consideration of William Chafe's
 history of the Civil Rights movement in Greensboro, North Carolina. Chafe
 describes the "progressive mystique," which, he argues, unintentionally-but
 very seriously-inhibited progress on racial justice. The mystique of progres-
 sivism has several qualities, one of which is a tendency to confuse speech and
 action. Chafe says that southern white liberals often mistook willingness to
 listen to unorthodox ideas as a kind of action: "After all, even the delicate issue
 of racial change could be discussed, and discussion, in turn, could be seen as a
 step toward action" (7-8). Chafe suggests that this sense that talking was ac-
 tion meant they felt no need to do anything more than talk. Therefore, white
 liberals thought changes were happening in regard to racial issues because
 there was talk of changes, but because there were no discernible policy conse-
 quences of these discussions, African Americans did not see the situation as
 similarly productive. Chafe suggests this "courtesy toward new ideas" (8) in
 effect obstructed social action-the confusion between open discourse (among
 a small and elite group of people) and action contributed to complacency
 among white liberals. By the standards of the white progressives Chafe dis-
 cusses-who simply wanted agonistic and expressive speech-their speech was
 perfectly good. By the standards of people who wanted political change-who
 wanted deliberative speech-it was not.
 In addition to a fundamental vagueness regarding what kind of discourse
 is supposed to be conducted in communities, communitarians maintain a
 vague, if not contradictory, use of the term community. Joseph Harris points
 to the two uses of the term "community of discourse" in composition studies.
 Sometimes it means, "specific physical groupings of people... an actual group
 of speakers living in a particular place and time" ("A Teaching Subject" 101). At
 other times it means something more abstract: "individuals who share certain
 habits of mind" (101) or "a free and voluntary gathering of individuals with
 shared goals and interests-of persons who have not so much been forced to-
 gether as have chosen to associate with one another" (102).
 549
This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Mon, 08 Aug 2016 18:33:39 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 CCC 54:4 / JUNE 2003
 One of the important theoretical bases for communitarianism is the no-
 tion, argued perhaps most forcibly by MacIntyre, that effective discourse re-
 quires consensus on a large number of points. If people do not agree on basic
 principles, they cannot even agree enough to have an argument. Commun-
 itarians extend this argument to the polis, concluding that a competent polity
 necessitates "a commonality of shared self-understanding" (Sandel, Liberal-
 ism 181). This is obviously Harris's second use of the term-communities con-
 structed by shared mental habits.
 Yet, this analysis of what is wrong with current argument (and what makes
 medieval practice so much better) seems odd to me. In addition to the fact
 that I have trouble seeing the age that MacIntyre admires as so much better-
 the consequences for people who argued themselves onto the wrong side of a
 declaration of heresy certainly keep me from seeing that era as especially
 golden-I see no reason to assume that shared definitions and better argu-
 ments go hand in hand. Agreeing on numerous things does not ensure that
 interlocutors will reach agreement on whatever they initially disagreed about.
 The Federalists and Anti-Federalists are a case in point-Brutus and Publius
 have more in common than not, but the one thing they do not have in com-
 mon (a desire that the U.S. would become a great commercial power versus a
 desire that it remain in a pastoral middle landscape peopled by petty bour-
 geois and yeoman farmers) was enough to preclude agreement on the need for
 the constitution. It is easy to list intra-disciplinary arguments on which there
 was never agreement but in which the positions would look indistinguishable
 to outsiders (e.g., Stanley Fish and E. D. Hirsch, Habermas and Hans-Georg
 Gadamer, Peter Elbow and Donald Bartholomae). The question is not simply
 how much people agree but on what they agree.
 Communitarians like Sandel do not explicitly call for a univocal moral
 discourse, and the most attractive (I think) aspect of their argument is the
 idea that we should not be so afraid of moral arguments in the public sphere.
 Yet they ignore one of the main reasons that people dislike such arguments.
 Sandel cites as an instance of such fear Joycelyn Elders's reaction when then-
 President Clinton said that having children out of wedlock is wrong. Elders,
 Sandel says, "continued to display the nonjudgmental reflex characteristic of
 contemporary liberalism ... stating, 'Everyone has different moral standards.
 You can't impose your standards on someone else"' (Democracy's Discontent
 328). But Sandel fails to acknowledge why so many people have that reflex, at
 least one reason being that they (we) are tired of the narrow judgementalism
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 that often goes hand in hand with hypocrisy (like Clinton's condemning the
 sexual morality of single mothers or the highly edifying example of Newt
 Gingrich raising the issue of Clinton's sexual morality). The examples that
 Sandel cites as indicating a revivifying of moral argument are not instances of
 people arguing about morals; they exemplify people asserting, but not being
 willing to argue about, a specific moral code. If the goal is to have a public
 sphere in which people argue with one another, then argumentsfrom morals
 are troubling. The problem with arguing from morals is that it ensures that
 people perceive an opposing argument as an immoral person. Why talk with
 someone who is immoral? Why listen?
 Arguing from a specific (and unarguable) moral code means seeing one
 (and only one) side as the moral one; hence, such arguments are so full of hate.
 And that too is something that communitarians fail to acknowledge-that a
 tremendous amount of"moral" discourse is hateful. Even the arguments from
 Maclntyre's golden era (the high middle ages) are loaded with issues about
 who is arguing the side of the devil; they are filled
 with accusations of heresy. The liberal answer is
 to avoid moral discourse altogether, and I agree
 that such evasion is disturbing. Yet, the more that
 the communitarian answer assumes that an irenic
 public sphere is both necessary and good, the more
 that it assumes that discourse can only be produc-
 tive among people who share moral systems and,
 thus, the more argument from, rather than about,
 morals.
 And this assumption of the necessity and
 desirability of an irenic public sphere, especially if
 This assumption of the necessity and
 desirability of an irenic public sphere,
 especially if connected to a definition
 of community as one with "shared
 moral visions," is subject to a fairly
 straightforward criticism: with such a
 formulation, dissent is dangerous. By
 that definition, the moment that one
 fundamentally disagrees with the
 group, the community no longer exists.
 connected to a definition of community as one with "shared moral visions," is
 subject to a fairly straightforward criticism: with such a formulation, dissent
 is dangerous. By that definition, the moment that one fundamentally disagrees
 with the group, the community no longer exists. A person who disagrees has
 made clear that s/he does not share the goals and interests and that s/he has
 different habits of mind, so there can never be significant dissent from within
 a community. Fundamental conflict and community are mutually exclusive.
 Chafe describes the way that this presumption of the need for communi-
 ties to be in agreement-another part of "the mystique of progressivism"-
 also prevented progress on racial issues:
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 The underlying assumption is that conflict over any issue, whether it be labor
 unions, race relations, or political ideology, will permanently rend the fragile fab-
 ric of internal harmony. Hence, progress can occur only when everyone is able to
 agree-voluntarily-on an appropriate course of action. (7)
 This assumption tends to benefit the status quo because an intransigent con-
 servative can keep any change from happening, while it tends to demonize
 dissenters because it makes them the ones who seem to have disrupted the
 consensus and destroyed the happy community (for a similar point, see Will-
 iam Lee Miller on the antebellum treatment of abolitionists). The privileging
 of a happy community means that dissenters are the problem. When they criti-
 cize the status quo, it appears that everyone was happy until the malcontents
 started stirring things up. This was, for instance, exactly the argument made
 by the "Eight Alabama Clergymen" who so famously called Reverend King's
 actions in Birmingham "unwise and untimely" (Carpenter et al. 42). They "point
 out that such actions as incite to hatred and violence, however technically
 peaceful those actions may be, have not contributed to the resolution of our
 local problems" (42).
 The immediate consequence of this sense that conflict threatens com-
 munity is that injustices-such as the injustice of segregation-never enter
 the realm of public discourse or are treated as local and temporary aberra-
 tions best resolved through observing "the principles of law and order and
 common sense" (Carpenter et al. 43). When civility prevails, no one wants to
 bring up such a divisive topic; when the topic is finally brought up, the issue
 becomes the behavior of those who violated the code of civility rather than
 their concerns regarding the injustice. Thus, attempting to have a public sphere
 without conflict means that one loses the ability to argue about central issues.
 So, in regard to civil rights, the discourse could quickly shift from the injustice
 of segregation to the appropriateness of those who even brought up the issue.
 This is what Chafe refers to as "the chilling power of consensus to crush efforts
 to raise issues of racial justice" (9). Prizing civility means that people who be-
 come confrontational or argumentative have violated a basic principle of so-
 cial discourse, and they should be shunned and condemned. This privileging
 of evading conflict contributes to social harmony and can even facilitate an
 effective public sphere as long as the disagreements are relatively minor, but it
 cannot accommodate people who are deeply unhappy with the system itself.
 And, to the extent to which one can say that there is a community, it is a
 community committed to injustice. Anthropologists have suggested that com-
 munity identity is often formed by identifying some group as hated; the shared
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 mental habits that define a community are not necessarily as benevolent as
 communitarians might hope. Even Sandel grants this possibility: "To accord
 the political community a stake in the character of its citizens is to concede
 the possibility that bad communities may form bad characters" (Democracy's
 Discontent 321). Etzioni responds to this kind of criticism-that communities
 may be committed to injustice-by saying that people are members of many
 different communities: "they can, and do, use these multi-memberships (as
 well as a limited, but not trivial, ability to choose one's work and residential
 communities) to protect themselves from excessive pressure by any one com-
 munity" (Introduction xiv). This response almost exactly misses the point. In
 addition to shifting back to talking about physical communities, Etzioni is
 describing precisely what worries people about the communitarian model: that
 people have a tendency to pull away from difference as much as possible and
 to spend as much of their time as they feasibly can with people who think and
 behave the same way that they do. The concern is that communitarian theory
 entrenches that tendency insofar as it presumes that discourse must be irenic
 to be productive, that community and conflict are opposed. Communitarianism
 does not ensure that members of more or less mainstream cultures hear other
 points of view. It does not necessarily complicate people's tendencies to slip
 into enclaves or stop them from universalizing on the basis of experience they
 do not even realize is limited. It is easily seduced by the mystique of progres-
 sivism in its overemphasis on the need for consensus and its failure to theo-
 rize conflict.
 III. Communities of discourse
 Compositionists' adoption of the notion of "communities of discourse" is usu-
 ally traced through David Bartholomae, Kenneth Bruffee, and Patricia Bizzell
 back to Stanley Fish, Richard Rorty, and, ultimately, Thomas Kuhn. Often used
 interchangeably with the term "interpretive communities," the term is vague
 about the exact cause-effect claim implicit in it. For some theorists, it simply
 means something along the lines of "community-based norms that influence
 writing" (Beaufort 488), while for others it necessarily endorses a strong form
 of social construction of knowledge. Thomas Kent's definition is "our knowl-
 edge of others and of the world always will be relative to the particular concep-
 tual schemes or communities in which we exist" (426). He connects this to
 "the claim that what we know is determined by or is relative to the community
 in which we live" (426). Thus, at one end of a spectrum, "communities of dis-
 course" means little more than genre conventions, with the implication that
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 At one end of a spectrum,"communities of discourse"
 means little more than genre conventions, with the
 implication that people can move easily from one
 community to another; at the other end, the term
 becomes determinist, with the implication that
 communities of discourse so shape one's ability to
 know that discourse among communities is impos-
 sible or"incommensurable,"to use Kuhn's language.
 people can m ve asily from one
 commu ity to another; at the other
 end, the ter  becomes determin-
 ist, with t e implication that com-
 munities of discourse so shape one's
 ability to know that discourse
 among communities is impossible
 or "incommensurable," to use
 Kuhn's language.
 Most of the criticisms of the notion involve that stronger form; the weaker
 cause-effect claim has been more or less ignored. The criticisms generally run
 along one of three lines. Some theorists (Myers, Harris, or Trimbur) argue that
 the concept can easily describe students as people who must submit to the
 community, so writing classes become rites of passage into communities whose
 very nature students do not have the opportunity to critique or change. Enter-
 ing the community means conforming to its standards, and the goal of all dis-
 course is consensus, so that this is a fundamentally (albeit unintentionally)
 conservative project. A second, and closely connected, criticism is that the
 concept of a community of discourse overemphasizes agreement and unifor-
 mity, downplaying the tensions and disagreements that any community actu-
 ally has (Cooper, Beaufort). The third criticism, one most effectively made by
 Kent, is that the epistemology at the very base of the notion is overdetermined
 and inaccurate.
 The first two lines of criticism generally end with a call for a revision of
 the concept that would permit more conflict and somehow derail a communi-
 ty's rush toward consensus. John Trimbur, in his response to Bruffee, describes
 a practice in which he encourages his students to see a particular community
 of discourse (e.g., literary critics) as constructed by conventions that are par-
 ticular, fractured, and open to dispute. In making this argument, Trimbur sig-
 nificantly (in both senses of the word) shifts the meaning of Bruffee's central
 metaphor: negotiation.
 The metaphor of negotiation recurs in articles concerning communities
 of discourse, and it points to a central tension in the concept: what sort of
 relation students have to the conventions of the community of discourse they
 are trying to enter. Bruffee has students negotiating "the rocks and shoals of
 social relations" (403) whereas Trimbur has students negotiating "differences"
 (607). When a boat negotiates rocks and shoals, the boat does all the accom-
 modating-the rocks and shoals will remain exactly where they began. Simi-
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 larly, the boat does not necessarily change as it passes by the various dangers.
 As in my reading of the homophobic student narrative, there is always the pos-
 sibility that the boat, rocks, and shoals will end as they began.
 Trimbur's use of the metaphor of negotiation, however, is the kind of ne-
 gotiation that occurs between two people, both of whom are expected to make
 accommodations. Of course, social relations are not really rocks and shoals-
 they are not really all that stable-but they are not always subject to the stu-
 dents' changing them. The other use of the negotiation metaphor may initially
 seem to be one that assumes more power on the part of students, but it too is
 problematic. While in theory, negotiation may imply equality and reciprocally
 binding obligations, in practice negotiation is often indistinguishable from
 bargaining. It is naive to think that students negotiate as equals with commu-
 nities of discourse or even that students have equal power when negotiating
 with one another.
 In an important sense, I am being unfair to Schriner and Rice. If my main
 point is that their piece is insufficiently theorized in regard to concepts like
 community, negotiation, and difference, it would be We need to imagine a public space in
 legitimate for them to reply that they were, after all, wich people do not simply speak to
 just writing a Staffroom Interchange piece about the
 each other but one in which they
 benefits they saw in a classroom mailing list. They
 were not trying to write a theoretical piece about isten And one in which they argue.
 communities of discourse; they were just using the concept. And that is my
 point. The situation that Schriner and Rice describe is a common one; anyone
 who has used mailing lists or engaged in student-centered discussion has had
 experiences similar to a student arguing for execution of homosexuals. And
 those theoretical pieces about communities of discourse-including ones like
 Trimbur's or Harris's that try to modify the concept-do not help. Moving to
 communitarian political theory is not necessarily any more helpful.
 I agree with Trimbur, Harris, and Jarratt that compositionists evade con-
 flict and that we need a model of teaching that makes conflict not simply a
 preliminary step toward consensus but a "public space where students can
 begin to form their own voices as writers and intellectuals" (Harris 116). But, it
 has to be a public space with rules. If all we strive for is "a sort of teaching that
 aims more to keep the conversation going than to lead it toward a certain end"
 (Harris 116), we can easily fall prey to the mystique of progressivism-mistak-
 ing a lively discussion for a place in which people are actually learning about
 difference. We need to imagine a public space in which people do not simply
 speak to each other but one in which they listen. And one in which they argue.
 555
This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Mon, 08 Aug 2016 18:33:39 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 CCC 54:4 / JUNE 2003
 Works Cited
 Beaufort, Anne. "Operationalizing the
 Concept of Discourse Community: A
 Case Study of One Site of Composing."
 Research in the Teaching of English 31
 (Dec 1997): 486-529.
 Beiner, Ronald. What's the Matter with
 Liberalism? Berkeley: U of California P,
 1992.
 Bruffee, Kenneth. "Collaborative Learning
 and the 'Conversation of Mankind."'
 Cross Talk in Comp Theory: A Reader. Ed.
 Victor Villanueva, Jr. Urbana: NCTE,
 1997.393-414.
 Carpenter, C. C. J., Joseph A. Durick, Milton
 L. Grafman, Paul Hardin, Noland B.
 Harmon, George M. Murray, Edward V.
 Ramage, Earl Stallings. "Public State-
 ment by Eight Alabama Clergymen."
 Audiences and Intentions. Ed. Arthur
 Quinn and Nancy Mason Bradbury.
 Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1997.49-50.
 Chafe, William. Civilities and Civil Rights:
 Greensboro, North Carolina, and the
 Black Struggle for Freedom. Oxford:
 Oxford UP, 1980.
 Clark, Gregory. "Rescuing the Discourse of
 Community." College Composition and
 Communication 45 (1994): 61-74.
 Cooper, Marilyn. "The Ecology of Writing"
 The Harcourt Brace Sourcebookfor
 Teachers of Writing. Ed. Patricia Roberts.
 Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace, 1998.
 105-16.
 Dahl, Robert A. Democracy and Its Critics.
 New Haven: Yale UP, 1989.
 . On Democracy. New Haven: Yale UP,
 1998.
 Etzioni, Amitai, ed. The Essential
 Communitarian Reader Lanham, MD:
 Rowman & Littlefield, 1998.
 Introduction. Ezioni ix-xxiv.
 . "A Moral Awakening without
 Puritanism" Etzioni 41-46.
 Etzioni, Amitai, et al. "Responsive
 Communitarian Platform" Etzioni
 xxv-xxxix.
 Goodin, Robert E. "Permissible Paternalism:
 In Defense of the Nanny State." Etzioni
 115-23.
 Habermas, Jiirgen. "Three Normative
 Models of Democracy." The Inclusion of
 the Other: Studies in Political Theory. Ed.
 Ciaran Cronin and Pablo De Greiff.
 Cambridge: MIT P, 1998. 239-52.
 Harris, Joseph. "Negotiating the Contact
 Zone" Journal of Basic Writing 14.1
 (Spring 1995): 27-42.
 - . A Teaching Subject: Composition
 Since 1966. New Jersey: Prentice Hall,
 1997.
 Held, David. Models of Democracy. Stanford:
 Stanford UP, 1996.
 Jarratt, Susan C. "Feminism and Composi-
 tion: The Case for Conflict." Contending
 with Words: Composition and Rhetoric in
 a Postmodern Age. Ed. Patricia Harkin
 and John Schilb. New York: MLA, 1991.
 105-23.
 Kastely, James L. From Plato to
 Postmodernism: Rethinking the Rhetori-
 cal Tradition. New Haven: Yale UP, 1997.
 Kent, Thomas. "On the Very Idea of a
 Discourse Community." College
 Composition and Communication 42
 (1991): 425-45.
 Killingsworth, M. Jimmie. "Discourse
 Communities-Local and Global."
 Rhetoric Review 11 (Fall 1992): 110-22.
 556
This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Mon, 08 Aug 2016 18:33:39 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 ROBERTS- MILLER / DISCURSIVE CONFLICT
 Kleiman, Mark. "Drug Abuse Control Policy:
 Libertarian, Authoritarian, Liberal, and
 Communitarian Perspectives." Etzioni
 217-25.
 Maclntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue: A Study in
 Moral Theory. 2nd ed. Notre Dame: Notre
 Dame UP, 1984.
 Miller, William Lee. Arguing about Slavery:
 John Quincy Adams and the Great Battle
 in the United States Congress. New York:
 Vintage Books, 1995.
 Myers, Greg. "Reality, Consensus, and
 Reform in the Rhetoric of Composition
 Teaching." Cross Talk in Comp Theory: A
 Reader. Ed. Victor Villanueva, Jr. Urbana,
 IL: NCTE, 1997.439-56.
 Nie, Norman H., Jane Junn, Kenneth Stehlik-
 Barry. Education and Democratic
 Citizenship in America. Chicago: U of
 Chicago P, 1996.
 Sandel, Michael. Democracy's Discontent:
 America in Search of a Public Philosophy.
 Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1996.
 . Liberalism and the Limits ofJustice.
 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998.
 Schriner, Delores K., and William C. Rice.
 "Computer Conferencing and Collabora-
 tive Learning: A Discourse Community
 at Work." College Composition and
 Communication 40 (Dec 1989): 472-78.
 Selznick, Philip. "Foundations of Communi-
 tarian Liberalism." Etzioni 61-72.
 Siegel, Fred. "The Loss of Public Space."
 Etzioni 187-98.
 Taylor, Charles. Philosophy and the Human
 Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1985.
 Trimbur, John. "Consensus and Difference
 in Collaborative Learning." College
 English 51 (1989): 602-16.
 Trish Roberts-Miller
 Trish Roberts-Miller is an assistant professor in the Division of Rhetoric and Com-
 position at the University of Texas at Austin. Previous director of composition pro-
 grams at University of Missouri at Columbia and University of North Carolina at
 Greensboro, she is the editor of the Harbrace Sourcebook for Teachers of Writing
 and author of Voices in the Wilderness: Public Discourse and the Paradox of Puri-
 tan Rhetoric (U of Alabama P, 1999). Her book on models of public discourse, De-
 liberate Conflict: Models of Public Discourse and the Teaching of Argument, will be
 coming out next fall from SIU Press.
 557
This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Mon, 08 Aug 2016 18:33:39 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
